Changelog

Logins, secure notes, cards and identities in an encrypted local vault, with multiple vaults that can be renamed and recoloured.

Unlock with a master password derived by Argon2id, with exponential backoff that survives a restart. There is no wipe-after-N-failures — it is too easily turned into a denial of service by somebody who has your file.

Unlock with Windows Hello, off by default. Your master password is still required every fourteen days, so losing the biometric never means losing the vault.

Copying a password decrypts it in Rust and writes the system clipboard directly. The value never enters the webview that draws the interface, and the clipboard is cleared after thirty seconds — only if what is on it is still what Trynta put there.

Revealing a secret is the one path a plaintext takes to the interface: one field, one item, on an explicit action, rate-limited to twenty a minute.

A password and passphrase generator built on the operating system's random source with rejection sampling, reporting the entropy it actually produced rather than a bar with a colour. The passphrase wordlist is the EFF long list, vendored and verified by hash.

One-time codes to RFC 6238 — SHA-1, SHA-256 and SHA-512, six and eight digits — from an otpauth:// link or a bare setup key.

A security report that scores every stored password and groups the ones used twice, with an optional breach check that sends the first five characters of a SHA-1 hash to Have I Been Pwned and matches locally.

Encrypted backup and restore under a passphrase chosen for the file, independent of the master password.

Fuzzy search over an index built in memory at unlock, measured under 16 ms at the 95th percentile on a vault of five thousand items.

Light, dark and follow-the-system themes, starting on light, plus themes you can write yourself as JSON. A theme is validated in Rust before anything is applied: it cannot fetch, and it cannot contain url().

A signed update check, which you can switch off.

Optional exclusion from screenshots and screen sharing, off by default.

A first-run tour: one card on the lock screen about what a master password is, and four inside the app. It runs once.

3,772 brand marks ship inside the application rather than being fetched. A favicon request per entry would announce, in the clear, every service you hold an account with.

The whole product makes exactly two outbound requests: the breach check above and the signed update manifest. A build-time check fails on a third, and the frozen acceptance suite asserts that opening the security report makes none at all.

The three 32-byte keys a live session holds are pinned with VirtualLock, keeping them out of the page file, and every key buffer is zeroed when it drops.

Never audited. No third party has reviewed the cryptography, the storage format or the platform code. Don't put credentials you actually rely on in this yet.

Windows only. The macOS target compiled and passed the full gate once, on 17 August 2026, and nothing macOS has been compiled since. There is no macOS build.

Sharing is not built. Multi-owner credentials are the reason this project exists and they do not exist. An X25519 keypair is generated and reserved for them; no key agreement happens anywhere.

The installers are unsigned. Windows SmartScreen will warn and will list the publisher as unknown. That warning is accurate — compare the SHA-256 on the release page before running anything.